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WINNER, BEST APPELLATE BRIEF IN THE 1997
NATIVE AMERICAN LAW STUDENT ASSOCIATION
MOOT COURT COMPETITION
Tim Reynon & Paul EchoHawk*
Questions Presented
I. Whether the County or Tribal Officials can exclude people from running
and voting in school board elections based on their political or racial status.
II. Whether the Tribe and the State, in their respective cases, are immune
from suit.
Statement of the Case
Taylor Nine Fingers is an enrolled member of the Black Earth Band of
Chippewa living within the Black Earth reservation, which is surrounded by
Cass County, on land held in trust with the United States. Winthrop P. Bearstail
is an enrolled member of the Sault Nation of Mohegans living within the
reservation on fee land on which he pays property taxes. Cass County has a
school board which has jurisdiction over all schools within the county and an
election commission which has jurisdiction over all county elections. Nine
Fingers filed an intent for candidacy in the Cass County's general school board
election. Shortly thereafter, Bearstail's petition to remove Nine Fingers from the
list of eligible candidates was granted. Thereafter, Elbert Hazel, a non-Indian
county resident, filed for and obtained an injunction for the Cass County
Election Commission prohibiting both Nine Fingers and Bearstail from running
and voting in the election due to their Indian status. All decisions of the
Election Commission are final and not subject to judicial review in courts. Nine
Fingers and Bearstail filed an action in the Federal Court in the Western District
of Wissotagan seekingdeclaratory and injunctive relief requiring the Election
Commission to enable them to vote and run for office. The District Court ruled
that Nine Fingers did not have the right to vote in county, state or federal
elections. Nine Fingers and Bearstail appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which
held that the county election commission could preclude Nine Fingers and
Bearstail from running for and holding office in the county school board and
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could preclude reservation resident Indians from voting for school board
members in the election. Nine Fingers and Bearstail filed a petition for review
with the United States Supreme Court.
Gertrude Anderson, a non-Indian, resides within the Fort Tribe reservation
but is not a member. The Fort Tribe operates its own school system which is
open to all children living within the reservation border and the Fort Tribe
school board has jurisdiction over all tribal schools within the reservation
boundaries. Ms. Anderson filed a petition to run in the tribe's school board
election and was subsequently denied by the Tribal Election Board. In fact, the
Election :Board denied all non-Indian petitioners for candidacy. As a result, Ms.
Anderson filed an action in the federal district court. The District Court ruled
that the Fort Tribe must allow Ms. Anderson to run in the school board election.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's order
and the Fort Tribe filed a petition for review in the United States Supreme
Court.
. Summary of the Argument
In the Seventh Circuit case, Respondent Cass County improperly excluded
Nine Fingers and Bearstail from running and voting in county elections because
it (1) constituted state action denying Petitioners their right to vote in violation
of the Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act, and (2) violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which protects members
of a suspect class from state infringement of the right to vote. Since the
classification chosen by the county election commission was not narrowly
tailored to accomplish any compelling state interest, the county action was
unconstitutional.
In the case of Ms. Anderson v. Fort Tribe, the Eighth Circuit erred in ordering
the Tribe to allow Ms. Anderson to run in the tribe's school board elections.
Since it was within the tribe's sovereign power, as a separate and distinct people,
to establish for themselves election procedures and qualifications, the tribe had
the right to exclude from their school board election individuals based on race
or political status. In addition, neither the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), the
Federal Constitution and Bill of Rights, nor the Voting Rights Act prohibits the
Fort Tribe from excluding individuals from their electoral process based on race
or political status. The Supreme Court found that the only federal court remedy
available under the ICRA was that of habeas corpus. Since the case at hand
does not involve that particular remedy, the federal courts do not have
jurisdiction to hear this case. Furthermore, the Supreme Court also held that the
Fifteenth, parts of the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments, as well as
portions of the Fourteenth Amendment do not apply to Indian tribes. As a
result, federal courts do not obtain jurisdiction under those provisions. The same
holds true for the Voting Rights Act. It is settled doctrine that absent legislation
to the contrary, courts cannot imply from a statute that it will apply to Indian
tribes. Since the Voting Rights Act is silent in this regard, the courts cannot
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apply it to Indian tribes. Additionally, allowing non-Indians to vote in tribal
elections clearly poses a threat to the tribe's welfare and political integrity.
II. Sovereign Immunity
In the Seventh Circuit case involving Nine Fingers and Bearstail, the
Eleventh Amendment poses no bar to Petitioners suit against the state, county,
or government officials. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the
Voting Rights Act waive sovereign immunity. Further, the defendant
government officials are not protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity where
their actions exceed the scope of their legal authority.
In the Eighth Circuit case, it is also clear that Ms. Anderson's suit is barred
by the Fort Tribe's sovereign immunity. Courts have continually recognized that
tribes have sovereign immunity from suit similar to that of the United States -
neither can be sued unless Congress expressly consents. Since Congress has not
given this consent, Ms. Anderson's claim is barred by the Fort Tribe's sovereign
immunity. Ms. Anderson cannot bring suit in federal court against the Fort
Tribe. The Court should reverse the Seventh and Eighth Circuit decisions and
hold that states and countries cannot exclude reservation Indians from state and
local elections and are not immune from suit. This Court should further hold
that the Fort Tribe can, absent explicit legislation to the contrary, exclude
,individuals from their school board elections based on race, and absent tribal or
congressional consent, the Fort is barred from suit.
Argument
L Respondent County Officials May Not Exclude Reservation Indians from
Running and Voting in County School Board Elections Based on Their
Political or Racial Status, Though Tribal Officials May Do So
A. Respondent County Officials May Not Exclude Petitioners - Reservation
Indians - from Voting and Running for Office in County School Board
Elections
1. Reservation Indians Have All the Rights of Citizens and Residents of the
Political Subdivision in Which They Live, Including a Constitutionally
Protected Right To Vote in State and Local Elections
The United States Constitution guarantees and protects the right of all
citizens to vote in both federal and state elections. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110
U.S. 651, 663-65 (1884); Lassiter v. Northhampton Election Board, 360 U.S.
45, 51 (1959); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661-62 (1944). Native
American Indians were generally given full United States citizenship in 1924,
8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1994), and Indians are citizens of the state and political
subdivision (county) wherein their reservation is geographically located.
No. 1]
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Wisconsin Potowatomies of Hannahville Indian Community v. Houston, 393 F.
Supp. 719, 730 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
Indians born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction are citizens
of the United States and of the State in which they reside. As such, these
citizens have all the constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities which
attach thereto - including the right to vote in federal, state, and local elections
in the districts in which they live. Little Thunder v. South Dakota, 518 F.2d
1253, 1258 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. State of South Dakota, 636 F.2d
241, 243 n.1 (8th Cir. 1981); White Eagle v. Dorgan, 209 N.W.2d 621, 623
(N.D. 1973). Their right to vote is protected by the provisions of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments which apply generally to all federal and state
elections as well as the actions of state officials acting under color of law. U.S.
Const. amend XIV, XV; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958) (The actions
of the local government are the actions of the state); Avery v. Midland, 390 U.S.
474, 480 (1968) ("[l]t is now beyond question that a State's political
subdivisions must comply with the Fourteenth Amendment"). Therefore, both
Nine Fingers and Bearstail are citizens and residents of the State of Wissotagan
and Cass County possessing the full voting rights as any other citizen of the
county.
2. Respondent's Exclusion of Reservation Indians from Voting in County
School Board Elections Is Based on Their Race as Indians in Violation of
the 15th Amendment
It is beyond dispute that the Fifteenth Amendment guarantees the right of
people, regardless of their color or political persuasion, to cast their votes
effectively and prohibits government actions that directly affect access to the
ballot on account of race. U.S. Const. amend. XV; Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55, 61-62 (1980); Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358, 364 (1969); Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1953) (15th Amendment bars racial discrimination in
national, state, and local elections). The adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment
had the effect of rendering inoperative conflicting laws which restricted the right
of suffrage to the white race. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 391 (1880);
United State v. Alabama, 252 F. Supp. 95, 97 (1966). Stated succinctly, under
the Fifteenth Amendment, "voting rights cannot be denied on basis of race."
Kimble v. County of Niagara, 826 F. Supp. 664, 670 (W.D. N.Y. 1993)
(emphasis added).
In the instant case, Respondent's exclusion of Indians is facially based on two
factors: their location on an Indian reservation and their race. Since only a small
number of Indians live off-reservation, the exclusion is in essence an exclusion
of Indians as a racial group from the Cass County School Board election. The
Supreme Court has recognized that direct state denials of suffrage on account
of race is forbidden, "that is to say, that as the command of [the Fifteenth
Amendment is] self-executing and reached without legislative action the
conditions of discrimination against which it was aimed .... " Guinn v. United
266 [Vol. 22
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States, 238 U.S. 347, 363 (1915); see United States v. Amsden, 6 F. 819, 822
(D. Ind. 1881); Apache County v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903, 906 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324-27 (1966)
(Fifteenth Amendment is self-executing and invalidates state voting
qualifications or procedures which are discriminatory on their face or in
practice).
It does not matter that Cass County officials acted without the mandate of a
state law because county action is state action for purposes of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Further:
[a] law... fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if...
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and
an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material
to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the constitution.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
Although the States have long been held to have broad powers to determine
the conditions under which citizens might exercise the right of suffrage, States
may not establish voting qualifications that discriminate on the basis of race.
Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1202 (1996); Davis v.
Water- Sewer and Sanitation Commission, 223 F. Supp. 902, 904 (W.D. Ky.
1963). Though the Cass County Election Commission possessed authority to
institute reasonable regulations on the school board election, discriminating
against Indians under the guise of drawing voting boundaries does not overcome
constitutional prohibitions.
In Gomillian v. Lighfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), state authorities set voting
boundaries creating a twenty-eight sided district that effectively excluded the
overwhelming majority of black voters in the district while not disenfranchising
a single white voter. Stating the invalidity of such action, the Court noted that,
"[a state's power to change boundaries of political subdivisions], extensive
though it is, is met and overcome by the Fifteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, which forbids a State from passing any law
which deprives a citizen of his vote because of his race." Id. at 345. Similarly,
Respondent's exclusion of reservation Indians resulted in a county school board
voting district missing most of its center and containing small enclaves of white-
owned fee land within the reservation area. In comparison, the twenty-eight-
sided figure invalidated in Gomillion seems almost square. Permitting
Respondent's action under the guise of power to set election boundaries would
allow a State to impair voting rights whatever extensively so long as the action
was cloaked in the garb of the realignment of political subdivisions. Frost &
Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 271 U.S. 583, 594
(1926). "'It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the
United States may thus be manipulated out of existence."' Il Respondent's
No. 1]
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exclusion of reservation Indians on account of their race is thus a violation of
the Fifteenth Amendment.
3. Cass County's Exclusion of Reservation Resident Indians from Voting
and Holding Office in School Board Elections Violates Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act
Section 1973(a) of the Voting Rights Act states:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting.., shall be
imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race ....
(b) A violation of subsection (a) ... is established if, based on
the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes
leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) ....
Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
This section establishes a general prohibition against voting procedures which
result in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race or
color, Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 157 (1993), and counties, cities, and
school districts in the state of Texas are "political subdivisions" as defined in
this section. Hereford Independent School Dist. v. Bell, 454 F. Supp. 143, 144-
45 (N.D. Tex. 1978). Also, Indians are a protected class under the Voting
Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (1994); Windy Boy v. Big Horn County,
.647 F. Supp. 1002, 1006 (D. Mont. 1986).
The Voting Rights Act prohibits the imposition of any electoral practice or
procedure that "results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen to
vote on account of race or color." Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 383 (1991)
(emphasis added). Under the "results" test for determining a violation of the
Voting Rights Act, a violation exists if,
based on totality of circumstances, it is shown that political
processes leading to nomination or election in state or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a
class of citizens protected . . . in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of electorate to participate in
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
Bush v. Al Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1960 (1996).
An application of these principles to Cass County's exclusion of reservation
Indians from county elections clearly demonstrates a violation of the Act.' A
1. Nearly every case that has been adjudicated under the Voting Rights Act involves
malapportionment claims and vote dilution claims in at-large voting schemes where
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showing of unequal opportunity to participate in the county election process is
clear-cut where Respondent County Election Commission has completely
excluded Indians, who are a protected class, from electoral participation. This
conclusion is reinforced by the long history of discrimination Indians have
experienced in voting, Respondent's denial of reservation Indians' access to
county school board candidacy, and the likely presence of substandard
education, employment, and health services on the reservation.' Therefore,
Respondent's exclusion of reservation Indians from county elections is a clear
violation of the Voting Rights Act in that the exclusion results in the denial of
Indian citizens' voting rights.
4. Respondent's Exclusion of Indians from Voting in County School Board
Election Violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment Which Guarantees the Indians' Right to Vote
Respondent's exclusion of Indians is not a permissible restriction on the right
to vote within the state's authority to regulate state and local elections because
it is an over-inclusive racial classification and an unreasonable restriction of the
right to vote, thereby failing to pass strict scrutiny analysis that applies to
Respondent's actions in this case. Although the Constitution "reserves to the
States the power to set voter qualifications in state and local elections .... [the
States may not establish restrictions where] the people through constitutional
amendments have specifically narrowed the powers of the States." Blassman v.
Markworth, 359 F. Supp. 1, 4 (N.D. Ill. 1973). The Supreme Court has held on
discriminatory practices are not easily distinguished on the face of the state action. Because most
persons are not completely excluded from voting in these cases, satisfying the results test is much
easier in the instant situation where voters of a protected class are excluded outright by the action
of a state political subdivision.
2. The legislative history of section 2 sets out "typical objective factors" to guide courts in
analyzing a discriminatory result of an election system or practice, although not exhaustive or
conclusive of a section 2 violation, see United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d
1546, 1574 (8th Cir. 1984), which include:
(1) the extent of any history of official discrimination in state or political
subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to
register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; (2) extent
to which voting in the election at issue is racially polarized; (3) extent to which
the... political subdivision has used... other voting practices or procedures that
may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; (4) if
there is a candidate's slating process, whether the members have been denied
access to that process; (5) Extent to which the members of the minority group in
their political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as
education, employment, and health, which hinders their ability to participate
effectively in the political process; (6) Whether political campaigns are
characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; (7) Extent to which member of a
minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., at 28-29, H.R. REP. No. 227, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., at
30.
No. 1]
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a number of occasions that state action regulating suffrage is not immune from
the impact of the Equal Protection Clause. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 342 (1972); Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
This Court has held that the right to vote is tantamount to a fundamental
right in terms of equal protection analysis and state infringement of the right
must be "carefully and meticulously scrutinized." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 562 (1964); see Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626
(1969). The Court has also recognized that "a citizen has a constitutionally
protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens
in the jurisdiction." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).
Further, a state classification based on race is innocently suspect and
demands strict scrutiny to pass constitutional muster. Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944);
Adarand 'Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2110 (1995). "Racial and
ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most
exacting judicial examination . . . . This perception of racial and ethnic
distinctions is rooted in our Nation's constitutional and demographic history."
Regents v. Univ. Of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978). Because
Respondent's exclusion of Indians is facially a racial classification, this is an
additional ground for application of strict scrutiny to Respondent's actions in this
case.
The Supreme Court has held that a State may not restrict school board
elections to those voters who pay property taxes or have children attending
schools within the district. See Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S.
621, 622 (1969). The decision in Kramer indicated that such restrictions were
not compelling state interests. Id. at 633. Thus, Respondent may not rely on the
fact that reservation Indians do not pay property taxes toward school board
revenue as a reason to exclude them under strict scrutiny. On the contrary,
Indians living on reservations may have significant interests in the outcome of
the county school board elections. For example, county resident Indians are free
to send their children to county schools that are closer to their homes or
preferable for other reasons. More importantly, owners of fee land within the
reservation are fully subject to property taxes that are spent by the county school
board. Clearly, these facts establish a substantial interest of reservation Indians
in the county school board elections. In fact, in the instant case, Bearstail is a
non-tribal member who owns fee land within reservation boundaries and pays
county property taxes. Consequently, Bearstail and other similarly situated
Indians have a substantial interest in county elections.
The Eleventh Circuit has held that permitting city residents to vote in county
school board elections, despite their diminished interest, is permissible. See
Davis v. Linville, 864 F.2d 127, 129-30 (1 1th Cir. 1989); Sutton v. Escambia
County Board of Education, 809 F.2d 770, 775 (1 1th Cir. 1987), reh'g en banc
denied, 817 F.2d 761 (1987) (holding that city residents had substantial interest
in the operation of the county school systems and could vote in county board
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss1/8
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elections)? Further, in the few instances the Supreme Court has permitted the
exclusion of disinterested voters, the cases involved clearly proprietary
governmental bodies. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 734-35 (1973) (permitting only landowners to vote for
officers of a water storage district due to the extremely limited purpose of the
district); Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 (1981) (permitting similar voting
restriction but stressing the importance of the narrow purpose of the district and
de-emphasizing the disproportionate impact of its administration on non-land-
owners). Significantly, the Court has rejected the extension of this "special
purpose body" exception to attempts to restrict voting in educational districts to
property taxpayers. See Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1970).
Cass County has jurisdiction over all schools within the county. The Court
has never permitted a school board district to exclude otherwise qualified voters
within the district's jurisdiction based on the level of interest excluded voters had
in the operation of the school board. In Sutton v. Escambia County Board of
Education, 809 F.2d 770 (1 1th Cir. 1987), the court stated that parties seeking
to exclude city residents from voting in a county election have the burden of
demonstrating that the resident city voters do not have a substantial interest in
the operation of the county school district. Id at 772. There is no showing by
Respondents that reservation Indians do not have a substantial interest in the
operation of the county school board. On the contrary, there is evidence that a
number of Indians living on the reservation may have children attending county
schools and/or pay property taxes on fee land for county school board revenue.
Even assuming, arguendo, that restricting the vote to interested voters is a
compelling state interest where Indian residents far outnumber non-Indians, the
exclusion of Reservation resident Indians is a classification that is not
sufficiently tailored to accomplish a legitimate state purpose and thus fails equal
protection analysis. Classifications that "disadvantage a 'suspect class,' or that
impinge upon the exercise of a 'fundamental right!" are treated as presumptively
invidious and the state must demonstrate "that its classification has been
3. But see Hogencamp v. Lee County Board of Educ., 722 F.2d 720, 722-23 (11 th Cir. 1984)
(holding that city contribution of 2.74% of county's budget did not create substantial enough
interest entitling city residents to vote for county board members); Phillips v. Andress, 634 F.2d
947, 952 (5th Cir. 1981), Creel v. Freeman, 531 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1066 (1977) (both upholding challenges to an Alabama statute permitting city residents to
vote for county school board members); Hosford v. Ray, 806 F. Supp. 1297, 1307-08 (S.D. Miss.
1992) (holding that allowing city electors to vote in county election of county school
superintendent where city had its own school district, contributed no money to county school
budget and where there was little or no student crossover was a dilution of county vote in
violation of equal protection). These cases are distinguishable in that they all involve little or no
student crossover and completely separate funding schemes. In the instant case, it is possible that
there is a large amount of student crossover and property tax funding from Indian fee land within
the reservation.
No. 1]
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precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest." Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982) (emphasis added).
The classification by Respondents of reservation Indians is both over- and
under-inclusive in that it excludes interested voters and includes voters with
attenuated interest in the operation of the county school board. The County
Election Commission classification is over-inclusive in that reservation Indians
who may have children attending county schools and reservation Indians who
may pay property taxes to fund the county school, like Bearstail, are excluded
form voting. The.classification excluding reservation Indians is under-inclusive
in that, while forbidding interested citizens like Bearstail to vote, it allows all
whites in the county to vote where they may neither have children attending
county schools nor pay property taxes. It is, therefore, not sufficiently narrowly
tailored to survive strict scrutiny analysis. See Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
5. Respondent's Exclusion of Indians from Running in County School
Board Elections Also Violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment
The Eighth Circuit has held "that the principles applicable to state election
voting qualifications apply with equal force to cases involving qualifications for
state offices." Blassman v. Markworth, 359 F. Supp. 1, 6 (N.D. Ill. 1973). A
number of courts have held that the right to run for office is similarly protected
by the constitution and restrictions on candidacy access are also subject to strict
scrutiny. See Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 195-96 (1st Cir. 1973); Johnson
v. Cushing, 483 F. Supp. 608, 612-14 (D. Minn. 1980).
In Mancuso, the court recognized that "whenever a state regulates the right
to become a candidate for public office, it also regulates the citizens' right to
vote." Id. at 193. Consequently, any state action that substantially restricts the
right to candidacy must be given strict scrutiny and meet the* test that the
restriction is justified by a compelling state interest. Id. at 195. Although the
right to be a candidate is not a per se "fundamental right" for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause, courts will "strictly scrutinize" restrictions on a
candidacy which has a substantial and invidiously discriminatory effect on the
voters. See Blassman v. Markworth, 359 F. Supp. 1, 6 (1973); Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972). Accordingly, the same principles and
conclusions of law apply with equal force to the Respondent's exclusion
preventing reservation Indians from running for county office.
B. Tribal Officials Can Exclude People from Running and Voting in School
Board Elections Based on Their Political or Racial Status
1. Tribes Are Distinct, Independent Political Communities Retaining Their
Sovereign Powers of Regulating Their Internal Affairs
From the earliest cases involving disputes between Indians and non-Indians,
the Supneme Court has repeatedly recognized some form of tribal sovereignty.
272 [Vol. 22
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In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), the Court stated that
"Indian tribes are 'distinct, independent political communities, retaining their
original natural rights' in matters of local self-government." Id. at 55-56 (quoting
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) and citing United States
v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975); Felix Cohen, Handbook of Federal
Indian Law 122-23 (1945)). Later, the Court observed that "[a]lthough no longer
'possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty,' they remain a 'separate people,
with the power of regulating their internal and social relations."' I&2 (quoting
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886) and citing United States
v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978)). In elaborating on this concept of tribal
sovereignty, the Court cited to Felix Cohen, whom had previously explained that
this sovereign power included the right to define how tribal leaders are elected.
Cohen wrote:
The first element of sovereignty ... is the power of the tribe to
determine its own form of government. Such power includes the
right to define the powers and duties of its officials, the manner of
their appointment or election, the manner of their removal, the rules
they are to observe in the capacity as officials and the forms and
procedures which are to attest the character of acts done in the
name of the tribe.
Felix Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 126 (Univ. of N.M. photo.
reprint 1971) (1942). Thus, in citing Cohen, the Supreme Court recognized the
right of tribes to determine for themselves the manner in which tribal leaders are
elected.
Additionally, Congress also recognized this tribal right of self-determination
in tribal elections. The legislative history behind the enactment of the Indian
Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994), demonstrated
Congress' intent "to protect the individual rights of Indians, while fostering tribal
self-government and cultural identity." Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of
Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 507 F.2d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir.
1975) (citing 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837, 1863-67; Note, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1343,
1353-60 (1969); 9 Harv. J. Legis. 556 (1972)). Congress recognized that tribes,
being quasi-sovereign entities, were not subject to all of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights, and consequently, Indians, and those within tribal jurisdiction,
would not have the same protections as those living outside tribal jurisdiction.
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56; Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca
Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 880-81 (2nd Cir. 1996); Wounded Head, 507 F.2d at
1082. As a result, Congress enacted the ICRA. The history behind this statute
shows that in addition to protecting individual rights, both Congress and the
President were very concerned with protecting the tribes' right to self-
government. In fact, one month prior to the passage of the ICRA, President
Johnson urged "its enactment as part of a legislative and administrative program
with the overall goal of furthering 'self-determination,' 'self-help,' and
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'self-development' of Indian tribes." Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 63 n.1 1
(citing 114 Cong. Rec. 5518, 5520 (1968)). As the Court in Wounded Head
stated, "[iln thus creating a statute with twin, and possibly conflicting, goals, the
form of government and the qualifications for voting and holding office were
left to the individual tribes." Wounded Head, 507 F.2d at 1082.
In Wounded Head, the petitioners filed a class action suit seeking a
declaratory judgment that the 26th Amendment to the United States Constitution
was applicable to tribal elections and an injunction enjoining tribal council from
preventing 18 to 21-year-old members of the tribe from voting in tribal
elections. The petitioners relied on two cases, White Eagle v. One Feather, 478
F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973), and Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir.
1973), that held that tribes were required to treat votes equally in accordance
with Barer v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (one-man, one-vote). Wounded Head,
507 F.2d at 1083. They cited these cases to support their claim that the scope
of the [CRA's equal protection clause was the same as the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection clause. The Eighth Circuit Court, in dismissing
petitioners contention, stated:
We agree that it is not a significant interference with any important
tribal values to require that a tribe treat equally votes cast by
members of the tribe already enfranchised by the tribe itself. But
we suggest that employing the ICRA to require a tribe to
enfranchise a new class of the tribal population would present a real
question of whether, to some extent, this court was 'forcing an alien
culture.., on this tribe.' Certainly it can be argued that, given the
quasi-sovereign status of the Indian tribes, they should be permitted
to determine the extent to which the franchise to vote is to be
exercised in tribal elections, absent explicit Congressional
legislation to the contrary.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Daly, 483 F.2d at 704-05 (Indians, in designing
their own apportionment plan and election rules, are entitled to set those
requirements they find appropriate so long as they are uniformly applied);
McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629, 656 (D. Utah 1973) (Inherent in the
authority to govern itself is the authority of the tribe to determine the manner
in which differences are resolved and the manner in which its leaders are
selected). Thus, Wounded Head and similar cases stand for the notion that,
"federal courts should not, absent explicit legislation to the contrary, interfere
with the internal governmental affairs of Indian tribes." Wounded Head, 507
F.2d at 1082; see Wheeler v. Swimmer, 835 F.2d 259, 261-62 (10th Cir. 1987).
Applying these principles to the case at hand, it is clear that allowing non-
Indians to vote in tribal elections, interferes with the internal governmental
affairs of the Fort Tribe, as well as forces an alien culture on this tribe. As the
Court in Swimmer recognized, "[t]he right to conduct an election without federal
interference is essential to the exercise of the right to self-government."
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Swimmer, 835 F.2d at 262. The Tribe, in exercising this right, decided to
exclude all non-Indians from their school board election, including Ms.
Anderson. While the complainant charges the Tribe with discrimination, the
Tribe merely exercised its recognized sovereign rights.
Looking at the decision of the Eighth Circuit in this case, the Court erred in
ordering the Fort Tribe to allow Ms. Anderson to participate in the tribe's school
board election. Because Ms. Anderson resides on the reservation and her
children may attend a school under the direct supervision of the tribal school
board, it is easy to see why Ms. Anderson wanted to participate in the tribe's
school board elections. Arguably Ms. Anderson has an interest in the Fort
Tribe's school board elections. Despite these facts, however, Ms. Anderson is
neither a member of the Fort Tribe nor an Indian. The tribe, by means of its
sovereign powers, has the right, absent congressional legislation stating
otherwise, to exclude her. The Supreme Court, in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), noted that "Indian sovereignty is not conditioned
on the assent of a nonmember; to the contrary, the nonmember's presence and
conduct on Indian lands are conditioned by the limitations the Tribe may choose
to impose." Id. at 147. In the case at hand, the Tribe chose to limit their school
board elections to members of the Tribe. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 558 (1975), rejected respondents claim
that Congress could not subject them to Tribal Council authority since they were
non-Indians. IL (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) which stated, "It
is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian.... The cases in this Court have
consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reserva-
tions .... If this power is to be taken away from them, it is for Congress to do
it.") Since Congress has yet to abrogate the authority of tribes to determine for
themselves their election requirements and procedures, the Fort Tribe retains
their power to exclude non-Indians from tribal elections. Thus it is clear that the
Eighth Circuit's decision, ordering the Fort Tribe to allow Ms. Anderson to run,
clearly violates the Supreme Court's findings in Merrion, Mazurie, and Williams.
Consequently, this Court should reverse the Eighth Circuit's decision and hold
that Indian tribes have the right, based on their sovereign powers, to exclude
individuals based on race or political status. To hold otherwise would
"eviscerate the tribe's sovereign power to define itself, and thus would constitute
an unacceptable interference 'with a tribe's ability to maintain itself as a
culturally and politically distinct entity."' Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49, 72 (1978).
2. Neither ICRA, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, Nor the
Voting Rights Act Prohibit the Tribe from Excluding People from
Participating in the Political Process Based on Race
As previously aforementioned, the legislative history of the ICRA, as well
as numerous other cases demonstrate that neither ICRA, nor the Fifteenth
Amendment and some aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to Indian
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Tribes. In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court took an extensive look into the history
behind the adoption of the Indian Civil Rights Act. The Court noted that "[a]s
separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been
regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically
as limitations on federal or state authority." Id. at 56. To illustrate this point,
the Santa Clara Pueblo Court mentioned the case of Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S.
376 (1896), where the Talton Court held that "the Fifth Amendment did not
'operat[e] upon' 'the powers of local self-government enjoyed' by the tribes."
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56 (quoting Talton, 163 U.S. at 384). The
Santa Clara Pueblo Court went on to cite several cases where lower federal
courts had "extended the holding of Talton to other provisions of the Bill of
Rights, es well as to the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (citing Martinez v.
Southern Ute Tribe of the Southern Ute Reservation, 249 F.2d 915, 919 (10th
Cir. 1957), cert denied, 356 U.S. 960 (Due Process Clause of Fifth
Amendment); Native Amarican Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131,
134 (10th Cir.- 1959) (free exercise of religious beliefs under First and
Fourteenth Amendments); Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529, 533 (8th Cir. 1967) (Due Process Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment)). The Court continued its examination of the ICRA's
legislative history by pointing out that Title I of the ICRA, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1303 (1994), represented a congressional attempt to limit the power of tribal
self-government. They noted that in section 1302 "Congress acted to modify the
effect of Talton and its progeny by imposing certain restrictions upon tribal
governments similar, but not identical, to those contained in the Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment." Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 57. The
Court further explained:
Section 1302, rather than providing in wholesale fashion for the
extension of constitutional requirements to tribal governments, as
had been initially proposed, selectively incorporated and in some
instances modified the safeguards of the Bill of Rights to fit the
unique political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments.
Id. at 62-63. Thus, by enacting the ICRA without including certain provisions
from the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress intentionally
chose to preclude the application of those provisions to Indian tribes, and
consequently, tribes are not held to the same standard as federal and state
governments. As a result, nothing in the ICRA prevents'a tribe from excluding
individuals from participating in tribal elections based on race or political status.
In addition to the Supreme Court's examination of ICRA's legislative
history in Santa Clara Pueblo, numerous other cases indicate that neither
ICRA, nor the Fifteenth or parts of the Fourteenth Amendments prohibit tribes
from excluding non-Indians from elections. In Wheeler v. Swimmer, 835 F.2d
259 (10th Cir. 1987), disappointed candidates in the tribal election of the
Cherokee Nation brought an action alleging violations of the ICRA and civil
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rights statutes, as well as the Cherokee Nation's treaty, constitution, and
ordinances. The Court, in denying complainants, claimed that the Cherokee
Nation had surrendered some aspects of its sovereignty to the federal
government and consequently had different standing from other tribes with
respect to the policy against federal government intrusion into matters of tribal
self-government and tribal administration of civil rights disputes, looked to the
history surrounding the ICRA and concluded that, "'Congress, in the Indian
Civil Rights Act . . . elected to impose less supervision on tribal
administration of civil rights disputes than it imposes on federal and state
governments. The Act's legislative history indicates that this reflects a
deliberate choice by Congress to limit intrusion into traditional tribal rights."'
Id. at 261 (quoting Wheeler v. United States Dept. of Interior, 811 F.2d 549,
551 (10th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added)). Here, the Tenth Circuit recognized
Congress' intent to place greater weight on protecting tribal sovereignty rights
over that of protecting individual rights.
Additionally, the purpose of the ICRA was to "impose upon Indian
governments restrictions applicable to federal and state governments", there
were some specific exceptions, namely, "the Fifteenth Amendment, certain
procedural provisions of the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments, and in
some respects the equal protection requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 682 (10th Cir. 1971).
In accordance with that notion, the Court noted that, "the equal protection
clause of the ICRA is not coextensive with the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution", and
concluded that this holding "embodies the concept that the federal courts
should not, absent explicit legislation to the contrary, interfere with the
internal governmental affairs of Indian tribes." Id. As a result of these and
similar cases, tribes are free to set election qualification and procedures in
any way they deem appropriate.
Furthermore, the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994), does not
prohibit tribes from using race to exclude people from participating in the
political process since that Act does not apply to Indian tribes. The
Wounded Head Court made that clear when it stated:
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973bb-1 and 1973bb-2 [of the Voting Rights Act]
applies by its terms to states and political subdivisions, and
provides enforcement against states and political subdivisions
for violation of the Act. . . . Indian tribes are not states or
political subdivisions, and the legislative history of the Voting
Rights Act is silent as to whether the Act was intended to affect
the voting age [or voter qualifications] of Indians in tribal
elections.
Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge
Reservation, 507 F.2d 1079, 1084 (8th Cir. 1975). Thus it is clear, that
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since tribes are not states nor political subdivisions, and because the statute
is silent as to its application to Indian tribes, the Voting Rights Act does not
implicate nor apply to Indian tribes. Therefore, it is inapplicable in this
case.
In sum, since neither ICRA, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
nor the Voting Rights Act prohibit the tribe from excluding people from
participating in the political process based on race, the Eighth Circuit erred
in ordering the Fort Tribe to allow Ms. Anderson to run in the Tribe's
school board elections. Such decision clearly runs counter to congressional
intent, as well as the majority of judicial decisions. It is clear that the Fort
Tribe may exclude non-Indians from their school board elections.
3. Allowing Non-Indians To Vote in Tribal Elections Poses Serious
Threats to the Political Integrity, Economic Security or Health or
Welfare of the Tribe
The Supreme Court, in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566-67
(1981), held that the Crow Indian Tribe had no power to regulate non-
Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers
of the Tribe. In so holding, the Court relied on the case of Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 205 (1978) (tribes do not have
authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians), to support its
proposition that "the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not
extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe." Montana, 450 U.S. at
565. The Court concluded, however, that there were two exceptions to this
general rule. The court explained:
Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some
forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservation,
even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate . . . the
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may also retain
inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.
Id. at 565-66. Thus, the Court articulated two exceptions when a tribe could
exercise civil authority over non-Indians. It is the second exception that has
particular relevance to the case at hand.
In examining the first exception, it is possible Ms. Anderson has entered
into a consensual relationship with the tribe, but the facts are somewhat
vague. Since Ms. Anderson lives within the reservation boundaries, it is
possible that she leases her home from the Tribe or has some kind of
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employment contract with the Tribe. If either of these circumstances are
substantiated, then she has most likely entered into a consensual relationship
with the Tribe, and the Tribe would have some civil authority over her.
However, even if no consensual relationship exists, the facts clearly
demonstrate a threat to tribal political integrity and possibly the welfare of
the tribe, giving the tribe civil authority over Ms. Anderson under the
second exception. If non-Indians are allowed to vote in tribal elections, the
tribe will surely lose its identity as a separate and distinct people. Should
non-Indians gain a majority status within the reservation, as is the case with
a number of reservations throughout the country, non-Indians could redefine
membership qualifications, granting membership status to non-Indians. This
ability to define membership requirements has been recognized as a
fundamental part of a tribe's sovereignty. The Tenth Circuit in Nero v.
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 892 F.2d 1457, 1463 (10th Cir. 1989),
explained that "no right is more integral to a tribe's self-governance than its
ability to establish its membership. 'A tribe's right to define its own
membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its
existence as an independent political community."' Id. (quoting Santa Clara
Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32 and citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 564 and
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 n.18 (1978)). Thus,
interference with a tribe's right to determine its own membership is clearly
a threat to the tribe's political integrity, as well as its overall welfare.
Although the case at hand deals only with school board elections, as
opposed to general Tribal Council elections, the threat remains the same.
If non-Indians ever gain a majority of the school board seats, they could
very easily decide to do away with language and other cultural education
programs. Worse yet, they could pass laws that would punish anyone
practicing their language or culture, as was the case of the old boarding
schools in the early days of assimilation. While these may not appear as
immediate threats, the mere 'possibility of these occurrences clearly
constitutes a major threat to the future welfare of the Tribe, as well as its
political integrity. As the Nero Court concluded:
Applying the statutory prohibitions against race discrimination
to a tribe's designation of tribal members [as well as eligibility
requirements for tribal office] would in effect eviscerate the
tribe's sovereign power to define itself, and thus would
constitute an unacceptable interference "with a tribe's ability to
maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct entity."
Nero, 892 F.2d at 1463 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72).
Clearly, allowing the non-Indian complainant to vote in the Fort Tribe's
school board elections constitutes a threat to the Tribe's political integrity
and welfare. Since this clearly falls within Montana's second exception, the
Eighth Circuit erred by ordering the Tribe to allow Ms. Anderson to run in
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the school board elections. This being the case, this Court should reverse
the lower court's decision allowing Ms. Anderson the opportunity to
participate in the tribe's school board election.
I. Tribal Government Officials Are Immune from Suit for Excluding
People from Tribal School Board Elections Based on Their Political
Status or Race, Though Respondent State and County Actors Are Not
A. Respondent Cass County, Cass County Election Commission and Its
Members as a Board and Individually, and the State of Wissotagan Are Not
Immune from Suit for Excluding Reservation Indians from Voting in County
School Board Elections
1. The Voting Rights Act Abrogates the State's Eleventh Amendment
Sovereign Immunity
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments confer upon Congress the
power to abrogate sovereign immunity. Thus, the Voting Rights Act
"trump[s] the eleventh amendment" since it was passed under Section 2 of
the Fifteenth Amendment. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325
(1966) (fifteenth amendment "supercedes contrary exertions of state
power"); see also Dupree v. Mabus, 776 F. Supp. 290, 297 (S.D. Miss.
1991) (holding that plaintiffs asserting violations of Voting Rights Act are
not barred by Eleventh Amendment).
2. Cass County and Cass County Election Commission Are Not
Covered by Eleventh Amendment Immunity
In the case at hand, the County Election Commission, Cass County, and
County officials in their respective capacities do not enjoy sovereign
immunity. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 669 n.12 (1974). In
Edelman, the Court noted that where county officials act not in pursuance
of state law or policy but on county policies they are subject to the
commands of the Fourteenth Amendment and unable to invoke the
protection of the Eleventh Amendment. Id. (recognizing "the long-
established rule that while county action is generally state action for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, a county defendant is not
necessarily a state defendant for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.").
It follows that the Cass County officials and governmental bodies are not
immune from suit in federal court since there are no facts showing they
acted in pursuance of state law. Rather, they adopted an independent county
policy in excluding reservation Indians from county elections. Therefore,
Eleventh Amendment protections are unavailable to defendants. Both Nine
Fingers and Bearstail are thus not barred from asserting section 1983 Civil
Rights Actions against Cass County and its officials. 42 U.S.C. 1983
(1994).
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If a state subdivision is adjudged as an administrative agency, rather than
a governmental subdivision, then the Eleventh Amendment could apply.
However, given that the State of Wissotagan in this case has adopted the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994), sovereign immunity
is waived. Congress enacted such a waiver in the 1976 amendment to the
APA, which provides:
a person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief
other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or
an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an
official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be
dismissed nor relief therein denied on the ground that it is
against the United States or that the United States is an
indispensable party ....
Id. Therefore, regardless of how the county government is characterized,
there is no immunity from suit under the facts of the Seventh Circuit case.
B. Suits Against Indian Tribes Are Barred by Tribal Sovereign Immunity
1. Suits Against Indian Tribes Under the ICRA Are Barred by the Tribe's
Sovereign Immunity from Suit
The United States Supreme Court, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978), made it very clear that suits brought against
Indian tribes under the ICRA were barred by the tribe's sovereign immunity
from suit. In Santa Clara Pueblo, respondent sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against the enforcement of a tribal ordinance that denied
tribal membership to children of female members who married non-tribal
members but allowed membership to children of male members who
married non-tribal members. One contention raised by respondent was that
Congress had waived the tribe's sovereign immunity when it enacted the
ICRA and consequently, the tribe was amenable to suit. In disagreeing with
this contention, the Court stated:
It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity 'cannot be
implied but must be unequivocally expressed."' United States v.
Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976), quoting, United States v.
King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969). Nothing on the face of Title I of
the ICRA purports to subject tribes to the jurisdiction of the
federal courts in civil actions for injunctive or declaratory relief.
Moreover ... the provisions of § 1303 can hardly be read as a
general waiver of the tribe's sovereign immunity. In the absence
here of any unequivocal expression of contrary legislative intent,
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1997
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
we conclude that suits against the tribe under the ICRA are
barred by its sovereign immunity from suit.
Id. at 58-59; see Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 892 F.2d 1457,
1459 (10th Cir. 1989); Gold v. Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs
Indian Reservation, 478 F. Supp. 190, 196 (D. Or. 1979) (Indian tribe is
protected by sovereign immunity unless Congress has unequivocally
consented to waiver of such immunity); Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla
Indian Community, 451 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (D. Alaska 1978) (Any waiver
of sovereign immunity by Indian corporation must be clear and explicit).
Thus the Supreme Court made it very clear that the ICRA did not serve as
a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity and absent a clear legislative intent
to waive this immunity, tribes maintain their sovereign immunity against
suits brought under the ICRA.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in examining the dual objectives
promoted by Congress in the passage of the ICRA, i.e., protecting the
interests of tribal members against the tribe while at the same time trying
to further Indian self-government, stated:
Creation of a federal cause of action for the enforcement of
rights created in Title I, however useful it might be in securing
compliance with § 1302, plainly would be at odds with the
congressional goal of protecting tribal self- government. Not
only would it undermine the authority of tribal forums ... but
it would also impose serious financial burdens on already
"financially disadvantaged" tribes.4
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 64. The Court then concluded that
"Congress, aware of the intrusive effect of federal judicial review upon
tribal selfgovernment, intended to create only a limited mechanism for such
review, namely, that provided for expressly in § 1303 [habeas corpus]." Id.
at 70. Thus, the Court recognized that the only relief available to
individuals complaining of ICRA violations was habeas corpus.
Courts also recognize that Indian tribes possess "the common-law
immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers." Id. at 58
(citing Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919); United States v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 309 U.S. 506, 512-13 (1940);
4. The cost of civil litigation in federal district courts, in many instances located far from
the reservations, doubtless exceeds that in most tribal forums. See generally I AMERICAN INDIAN
PoucY REVIEW COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 160-66 (1977); MONROE E. PRICE, LAW AND THE
AMERICAN INDIAN 154-60 (1973). And as became apparent in congressional hearings on the
ICRA, many of the poorer tribes with limited resources and income could ill afford to shoulder
the burdens of defending federal lawsuits. See, e.g., 1965 Hearings 131, 157; Summary Report
1679; House Hearings 69 (remarks of the Governor of the San Felipe Pueblo); Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 n.19 (1978).
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Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Dept. of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172-73
(1977); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983).
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in deciding whether or not a tribe was immune
from suit brought by the California Department of Fish and Game seeking
declaratory judgement that the Department could apply California laws to
fishing and hunting activities on the Quechan Tribe's reservation, stated,
"[t]he sovereign immunity of Indian tribes is similar to the sovereign
immunity of the United States; neither can be sued without the consent of
Congress." People of State of California ex rel. California Dept. of Fish and
Game v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 595 F.2d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 1979).
Thus, it is unequivocally clear that tribes possess sovereign immunity from
suit similar to that of the United States. As a result, the claims brought
against the Fort Tribe are barred by the Tribe's sovereign immunity and the
court should dismiss for lack of federal court jurisdiction. Furthermore,
since the issues in the case at bar do not involve habeas review; the
complainants clearly do not have a cause of action against the tribe under
the ICRA. Hence, this Court should dismiss the matter for failure to state
a claim upon which relief might be granted.
2. Tribal Sovereign Immunity Bars Suits Against Tribe Brought Under
Federal Constitutional Provisions and Other Statutory Provisions
As discussed previously, the Fifteenth Amendment and some aspects of
the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as other provisions of the Constitution,
do not apply to Indian tribes. Consequently, the only arguable source of
relief for complainants in the case at hand is under the ICRA. Since relief
under the ICRA is also unavailable to complainants, as discussed in the
preceding section, this case must be dismissed. Federal courts clearly do not
have jurisdiction in this case. The only forum available to complainants in
this case is tribal courts. Consequently, the settlement of this dispute should
occur in tribal court.
In addition, the Voting Rights Act does not give Ms. Anderson a source
upon which to base her claim. As discussed previously, the Court in
Wounded Head made it clear that since tribes are not states nor political
subdivisions, the Voting Rights Act does not apply to them. Wounded Head
v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 507 F.2d
1079, 1084 (8th Cir. 1975). Therefore, Ms. Anderson cannot rely upon the
Voting Rights Act as the basis for a claim in this case. Consequently, this
Court must dismiss Ms. Anderson's case for failure to state a claim.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the petitioner respectfully requests this
Court to reverse the courts below.
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